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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION OF
DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 15711
vs.
JEFF STONE and/or LAKEWOOD
ENTERPRISES, INC., dba NEODENTURE CLINIC,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for contempt of
court on 120 separate violations of a temporary restraining
order wherein appellants had been enjoined from engaging in the
practice of dentistry without a license.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a verdict of

guilty the defendants-appellants appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a finding that the sentence as

1

posed by the court below was illegally imposed and thereb;
invalid or, in the alternative, that said sentence be remi·
to $100.00 fine and one-half of one day in jail.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 4, 1977 this Court, in the case of
et al., v. Dept. of Registration, State of Utah,

s~

P.2d

_ _ ,Supreme Court of Utah, number 14867, ruled that Sect:
58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 was constitutional and t:.

practicing dentistry, as defined by said statute, included
acts of offering or undertaking .

.

"to sup ply arti ficia:

teeth . . . or to take impressions of the teeth or jaws ..
(i.e., "denturism")".
On October 13, 1977 plaintiff-respondent filed a
Petition in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County requesting a preliminary restraining order against
appellants, alleging that they were practicing dentistry wr
out a license as defined in Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annot'
1953.

(R. 2-4)

On October 4, 19 77 the Honorable Marcessus K. Sno·
of that above entitled court issued a preliminary restrainr
order enjoining appellants from engaging in said activityr
set October 25, 1977 for a hearing on the matter pursuantr
an Order to Show Cause.

(R.

5-6)
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On October 26, 1977 said matter on Order to Show
Cause came before the Honorable David B. Dee of the same
above entitled court whereupon the court continued the restraining order in full force and effect as against appellants
pendente lite.

(R. 14, 15)

On January 20, 1978 respondent filed a Verified
Petition alleging that appellants were in willful disobedience
of the October 26th restraining order.

Pursuant to said Veri-

fied Petition appellants were ordered to show cause why each of
them should not be found guilty of, and punished for, contempt
of court for violations of Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.

(R. 23-25, 31-32)
The matter was heard on February 23, 1978 by the

Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
At the termination of the hearing on February 23,
1978, the court entered its Order as reflected by the Minute
Entry herein adjudging the defendants guilty of contempt, and
sentenced the individual defendant to one-half day in jail for
each of the 120 acts of contempt found to have occurred since
the temporary injunction entered and fining the corporate
defendant $100.00 per act of contempt which, according to the
Minute Entry, is sixty days in jail and $12,000.00 respectively.
(R. 38)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDER OF THE COURT BELOW IS INVALID IN THAT
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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SENTENCES IMPOSED WERE CONSECUTIVE RATHER
THAN CONCURRENT.
The court below sentenced the individual defendar:
to one-half of one day for each of 120 violations of its

~

straining order, each violation apparently representing the
estimated 120 number of impressions undertaken by defendant1
between the October 26th order and the February 23rd findinc
of guilt.

Since the cumulative sentence is sixty days in

e.

county jail then the sentence is necessarily consecutive ra:
than concurrent; likewise, the $100.00 fine per corporate

v~

lation is cumulative since the total fine imposed by the cot
was $12,000.00.

(R. 48-50, 52-53)

All acts committed by appellants, if contemptuous,
were closely related in time and were an accomplishment of;
single objective, i.e., a "single criminal episode", as defi:
by Section 76-1-401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; therefore U

1

provisions of Section 76-3-401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953

ar

said provisions providing for consecutive sentences only in·
case of felonies and contempt must necessarily be classified
a misdemeanor considering its limitations on punishment and
place of confinement.
This Court in McCoy v. Severson, 118 U.502 held&
when a person was convicted of separate crimes and several'.:'
of imprisonment were imposed at the same time, the sentences
were to run concurrently, in absence of a special court dire
or statute to the contrary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Beck v. Frontier Airlines, 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.
2d 281, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that where a series
of acts constitutes but one contempt of one court order there
cannot be punishment for each successive act.

In Beck the air-

line had been ordered to continue flights between two cities in
Nebraska and disobeyed the court's order.
The most celebrated cases of this type, of course,
involve the numerous Smith Act trials in the 1950's.

In Yates

v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 2 L.Ed 2d 95, and its progeny,
the courts imposed a sentence for contempt for each and every
refusal to answer a specific question by the prosecutor.

In

Yates the witness was asked eleven consecutive questions concerning her knowledge of communist party membership of others and
she refused to answer each question.

The court found her guilty

of eleven counts of contempt with the sentences to run concurrently.

The Supreme Court overturned ten of the eleven convic-

tions, holding that a finding of contempt for more than one refusal was an improper multiplication of offenses.
The 3rd Circuit Court in

u.

S. v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148,

held that separate refusals to comply with a court order (to
produce documents) did not make the defendant guilty of contempt for each separate refusal.
Since contempt is a criminal offense the criterion
for determining same is the same as for other crimes, i.e.,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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"Is the intent and objective of the contemnor divisible or:
pursuit of one course of conduct?"

That theory is followed

the majority of jurisdictions, e.g., Codespoli v.

Pennsyl~

418 U.S. 506, 41 L.Ed 2d 912; In Re Ward, 51 Cal Rptr 272,;
C.2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, cert. denied 385 U.S. 923, 17 L.Ed:
147.

When an impulse is single, but one offense
can be charged no matter how long the act
may continue . . . The test is whether it
is an individual act or acts which is prohibited or the course of action which they
constitute.
If it is the course of action
which is prohibited there can be but one
offense and one penalty. State v. Willhote,'
40 N.J. Sup. 405, 123 A.2d 237.
Yet another test is articulated by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.

In Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 57:

2d 188, the court said the test is whether "the subsequent:
temptuous conduct is so interwoven with previous conduct th;
it is inseparable therefrom."

At 192, 193.

This Court held in State v. Starlight Club, 17 U.i
174, 177 that three successive fines of $2,500.00

(the maxi:

under the statute) imposed against a private liquor club fo;
three illegal sales of liquor on successive Friday nights

tel

same undercover police team was excessive and this Court rer:'
the sentence to one fine of $2,500.00 only, and in doing so
that the three undercover purchases of liquor, each seven da
apart, were really "one episode designed to terminate defenc
charter, remove what someone thought to have been a loose or
ation in violation of the statute, and that really but oner_
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not three, was accomplished."
In the instant case we have acts, found to be contemptuous, which were carried out day after day in one ongoing
business routine.
acts or 1,000 acts
ance.

The State did not prove 120 acts or three
. only one 120-day period of noncompli-

If the acts of appellants are in fact contemptuous, then

the fine of $100.00 and a one-half day's jail sentence, total,
are sufficient and anything more is excessive.
Under any of the tests articulated by this Court or
the other courts cited above, appellants have followed but one
continuous course of conduct; one 120-day "act" of conducting
a business inviolate (as defined) of the existing business regulations of the state, conduct which was in pursuit of one
business objective at all times and consisted of the same type
of conduct on the first day following the order as it did on
the ll9th day following the order.
POINT II
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON APPELLANT IS EXCESSIVE
IN THAT IT BEARS NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO
THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE.
For practicing his trade, i.e., "denturism", if found
by the courts to amount to a violation of Section 58-7-6, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, appellant Stone presumably could serve up
to six months in jail; however, it is ludicrous to assume that
such a sentence would be imposed in light of today's sentencing
standards which normally call for suspended sentences for first
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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offenders even in felony cases.

Misdemeanor offenses invol

steal th, even violence, seldom result in jail sentences bei·
actually served.
In the instant case appellant Stone has hanging

0

his head a 60-day jail sentence for attempting to pursue a
mon occupation of life; conduct which the State failed to s'
was injurious to the public heal th or welfare, indeed, not
complaining patient was brought forward nor was any evidencc
negligent or sub-standard workmanship on dentures.
In addition to appellant Stone's impending incarc:
ation there exists an imposed fine of $12, 000. 00 on a corpo:
appellant which, in reality, is a fledgling business with 1:
resources.
In reality the court has imposed these stiff sent:
for violating the order of the court.

Both the United Stat:

Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have realized that
must be a limit to the courts' discretion in punishing cont!
In contempt proceedings courts should
exercise more than the least possible
adequate to the end proposal.
United
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
Ed 884.

never
power
States
91 L.

This Court, in Harris v. Harris, 14 U.2d 96, 377:
1007, held that 30 days in jail was an excessive penalty wh:
a contemnor father had paid only $60. 00 per month of a $10~
per month child support decree.

This Court admonished the·

courts of this State to exercise their power to punish for
tempt "within the confines of reason and justice."

At 100.
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Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized
the need for restraint when punishing contemnors.

That court,

in Shotkin v. Atchison, T & S.F.R.R. Co., 235 P.2d 990, held
a 60-day jail sentence and a $1000 fine to be excessive where
the contemnor had disobeyed an order enjoining him from instituting any further legal actions in court.

The court strongly

advised the state's trial courts to take all the circumstances
of each case into account before sentencing for contempt convictions and that the punishment should be reasonably related
to the gravity of the offense.
In a Georgia case a father had been punished for 238
separate acts of contempt, one for each day he kept his daughter
out of the jurisdiction.

The court held that even if each day

could be separately punished, the total could not be excessive.
(Kenimer v. State, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E. 2d 296.)
These appellants were not operating a fly-by-night
quackery.

This Court in the first Stone v. State case (supra)

acknowledged that the appellant Stone was probably better trained
to make dentures than a dentist.

Appellants here are not asking

this Court to consider whether the practice of denturism violates
the statute but rather to consider whether the court below has
exercised its power unreasonably in sentencing the appellant in
this case in a manner which does not relate to the gravity of
the offense committed by them.
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CONCLUSION
At issue is whether a judge in a trial court sitti
in Utah may sentence a contemnor for each individual act of
contempt comrni tted in furtherance of one single, albeit len.
criminal episode or continuous course of contemptuous condu
with one single objective.

The majority of courts, includi:

this Court, seem to say that such a multiplicity of penalti
is invalid and therefore the sentence in the instant casem
be vacated or, in the al terna ti ve, remitted to a sentence be
a more reasonable relationship to the gravity of the offense
involved.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of May, 1978,

ROBERT M. McRAE
Attorney for Appel~s

{t;)ct'

/

LONI F.
Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and co
rect copies of the foregoing personally to the office of

ue

Utah Attorney General on this 11th day of May, 1978.
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